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Abstract
Recent attention to shareholder activism in the business and
academic press has ignored the legal ramifications of that
phenomenon. Under current law, shareholders are neither
principals nor agents of the corporation, the board of directors, or
the other shareholders; those seeking to increase shareholder power
must confront this legal reality. Specifically, proposals for
increased shareholder power on the one hand and recent investor
attempts to gain actual management control on the other must both
be considered in light of the shareholders’ lack of fiduciary
responsibility. Moreover, all directors, including those
representing “activist” shareholders, are obligated to exercise
independent judgment about the best interests of the corporation
and may not delegate their decision-making duty either to an
individual activist shareholder or to an electoral majority of
shareholders.
A quiet (or at least obscure) corner of corporate law academia continues to debate the
“trend” (if it is a trend and not a sudden lumpy apparition) toward imposing fiduciary duties on
controlling shareholders.1 There are a number of people who believe this is not and should not
be the law, and I am one of those people. I have tried elsewhere2 to counter the arguments in
favor of imposing fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders and I will not repeat those
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arguments here. The crux of my argument is that fiduciary duties are owed by those who have
power, in the legal, “Hohfeldian,” sense, over other people’s persons or property. In the
corporate context, that is directors. Shareholders may have indirect power or influence, but they
have no legal power over corporate property, and certainly no legal power over other
shareholders’ property. They have power only over their own property (their shares) – a fact the
law recognizes by zealously protecting the shareholder’s right to vote3 and to sell his or her
shares.4
Developments since the turn-of-the-millennium financial scandals (commonly referred to
as “Enron”), have both confirmed my earlier arguments and raised new issues. For one thing,
the scandals have revealed that it is not only minority shareholders in closely held corporations
who are subject to exploitation and oppression. More interestingly, since Enron we have seen an
increase in “shareholder activism”. Some of this activism – efforts to improve governance in
public companies or to rein in executive pay – may be a fairly direct response to the excesses that
the Enron era exposed.5 Another form of activism, generally engaged in by hedge funds,
involves attempts directly to affect, and often to control, management decisions. This latter kind
of activism seems related to the Enron phenomenon only chronologically, although it perhaps is
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a response to related changes in the market. Both kinds of activism raise questions about
fiduciary duties in public corporations that have yet to be addressed.6
Most of the discussion of shareholder activism has been informed by practical economic
and financial considerations rather than legal ones. Law exists, however, and it will apply to
business developments such as shareholder governance proposals and hedge-fund activism. It is
therefore necessary to understand the relevant law and to consider recent developments in the
context of the current legal environment. To that end, I begin with a brief review of fiduciary
law, specifically the fact that fiduciary duties apply only to those who have legal power over
another’s person or property. In Part II I review the legal relationship between shareholders and
boards of directors, which is ordinarily a contractual one without fiduciary duties on either side
and is not, as some have suggested, a principal-agent relationship. In Part III I briefly examine
how the Enron-era scandals shed further light on the arguments about shareholders fiduciary
duties. Finally, in Parts IV and V I discuss current trends in "shareholder activism" and how
those trends should be understood in light of the law of fiduciary duties.

I. Introduction to Fiduciary Duties, Again
In order to decide whether some class of persons owes a fiduciary duty, one must first
determine what gives rise to fiduciary duties in the first place. Because fiduciary duties arose in
the ad hoc common law way, we do not have a clear explanation for their existence. However, it

6

For commentary addressing some of these issues, see Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty
to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders? 60 BUS. LAW. 1 (2004) (raising
questions about institutional investor activity generally); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate

3

is generally accepted that what makes a fiduciary a fiduciary is her power to make decisions with
regard to another person’s property or person.7 Because of that power, the fiduciary must act in
the best interests of the other person. A power creates a fiduciary duty if it enables the fiduciary
to make decisions that are legally enforceable and can result in liability for the beneficiary. This
is “power” in the traditional Hohfeldian sense, and it correlates to a resulting liability in the
beneficiary.8
Although the fiduciary has the legal power to bind the beneficiary, the beneficiary
sometimes has the legal right to control the fiduciary. That control is an essential feature of the
agency relationship, for example.9 Other beneficiaries, however, do not have control over their
fiduciaries. If a trust beneficiary tells her trustee to “invest in this great new stock I just read
about in a chat room”, and the trustee refuses, the beneficiary has no legal redress.10 Similarly,
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corporations do not have control over their fiduciaries.11 Some principals, although they are
legally empowered to exercise control, are in fact unable to exercise meaningful control over
their agents because of a lack of knowledge or skill. Unsophisticated clients of attorneys and
stock brokers are often as a practical matter completely at the mercy of their agents. This
difference in the degree of actual control that the beneficiary has over the fiduciary might
account for differences in the nature of the fiduciary relationship and the strictness of its rules,12
such as the “no further inquiry” rule in trusts, which absolutely prohibits a trustee from
transacting with the trust property even if the transaction would benefit the trust or the
beneficiary.13 Similarly, until recently trustees had no duty to disclose information, however
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material, to beneficiaries unless the beneficiary inquired,14 presumably because there was
nothing the beneficiary could do with the information. However, the amount of control that a
beneficiary has over the fiduciary is not an essential feature of a fiduciary relationship. Only the
fiduciary’s power to bind the beneficiary is necessary.
To give rise to a fiduciary duty, the fiduciary’s power over the beneficiary must be a legal
one; that is, it must give rise to legal liability on the part of the beneficiary. Many relationships
are characterized by one person’s ability to affect the life and behavior of another without the
ability to legally bind the other.15 I call this “moral control”. Some close personal relationships,
such as those between parents and adult children or spouses, have this feature. Moral control is
not the same as legal power. Consider the relationship between a person of weak character and a
person of dominating will. The dominating personality may control the weaker one, even to the
point of affecting decisions the weaker partner makes. But the power is not a legal one: If the
dominant character purports to enter into a contract for the submissive one without authority or
ratification, the law will not enforce the contract against the weak character. Correlatively, the
stronger character is not subject to a duty to protect the interests of the other person.16
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This is not to say that moral control is never legally relevant. The law has recognized
that moral control – the “position of trust and confidence” – can give rise to special duties in
making contracts, for example.17 It is also legally recognized in the law defining conflicts of
interest. Thus, where a director is accused of being “dominated and controlled” by an interested
director, the first director is deemed to be tainted by the interest.18 This is true even though the
interested director’s power of control is not legally enforceable.19 However, these are cases
where the law is attempting to determine the quality of an actor’s decision-making – whether a
contract is truly based on consent or whether a director was acting based on her own good faith
judgment. Moral control is not relevant for deciding whether a person has legal power over
another’s person or property and thus owes a fiduciary duty.

II. The Relationship Between Shareholders and the Board
At the risk of stating the obvious, I now proceed to examine the legal relationship
between the shareholders and board. To begin, it is worth noting that there are a variety of
actual relationships the shareholders and the board may have. In small corporations, for
example, the shareholders and the directors may be the same people. The relationship among
those people will vary widely and may have no structure other than that required by law.20
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Actual Relationships
In very large corporations, there may be no actual relationship at all between any of the
shareholders and the board, except to the extent the board members themselves own shares and
to the extent the occasional shareholder shows up at the annual meeting. The company will have
an “investor relations” page on its website, but it may take a shareholder a while even to find it.
The shareholders have invested in the hope that the company will make money, but they do not
care how the company does so. In short, they are passive investors. As many others have
pointed out, they are passive not only by choice, but because they lack the time, expertise, and
incentive to participate in management.21 This will be especially true if their holdings are highly
diversified. They rely on the board to make business decisions based on the board’s judgment
and expertise, not based on some idea of what the shareholders might want (other than
profitability). In this respect, one might say that the large publicly traded corporation functions
as a republic rather than a democracy.22
Even in large companies with dispersed shareholders, there are some matters that are of
interest to the shareholders if only because the shareholders are required to vote on them: the
election of directors, the amendment of the certificate of incorporation, and fundamental changes
such as mergers and the sale of all or substantially all the assets. The procedures applicable to
such matters, such as voting structures and antitakeover devices, are also relevant to the
shareholders. In addition, any matter that reduces or enhances the likelihood that the board and
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management will in fact seek to maximize the profitability of the enterprise (rather than their
own wealth) will be important to a shareholder who is paying attention. Institutions, such as
pension and mutual funds, are often shareholders who “pay attention” for a variety of reasons,
and their “activism” has therefore attracted considerable scholarly attention.23 Even institutional
shareholders will nevertheless be largely passive with respect to day-to-day, or even relatively
major, management decisions.
Other smaller corporations may operate on a true democracy or oligarchic model. Most
shareholders will have representation on the board, but the degree to which they have influence
will vary widely. In businesses owned by entrepreneurs and venture capital investors, for
example, the relationship between the shareholders will be highly structured by contract, and the
venture capitalists may expect to have direct input on business matters in some circumstances.24
In family businesses, on the other hand, the patriarch or matriarch may completely dominate
decision-making with the expectation that the other owners (who may be second or third
generation family members) will tag along as best they can.25
Legal Relationship: Principal and Agent?
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The actual relationship between shareholders and boards can be and has been carefully
examined from economic, behavioralist, finance and other perspectives. The legal relationship
between shareholders and boards must, however, be examined from a legal perspective. That
legal relationship is superimposed on the actual relationship (if any) between the board and the
shareholders. As noted above, the shareholders elect the directors and vote on fundamental
matters. Other than that, however, the shareholders have no legal role in the corporation and no
further legal relations with the directors. They can bring a derivative suit and thereby attract the
attention of the board, but there is no requirement that the board make itself available for
shareholder input. The directors, meanwhile, are fiduciaries because they have legal power over
the corporation (or, if you prefer, the assets and legal rights and obligations that comprise the
corporation). To whom are those fiduciary duties owed? The law clearly describes those duties
as owed to the corporation and all its shareholders.26 Most of the time this proposition is not
particularly troublesome as a practical matter. The shareholders are the ultimate, residual
beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise; if the corporation is profitable, the shareholders’
investment will increase in value and everyone will be happy even if that profit is achieved by
considering interests other than the shareholders’. Unfortunately, this fact has gotten caught up
in a policy debate between those who believe that corporate boards can or should consider or in
some cases prefer other interests (such as those of employees, customers, and all future life on
the planet) to those of the shareholders. Reacting to this position, others have argued for a
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“shareholder primacy norm” that requires that boards consider shareholders, and only
shareholders, in pursuing corporate policy.27
Of course, if shareholders’ interests are primary, then the primary problem of corporate
governance is the “agency problem” of boards and management preferring their own interests to
those of the shareholders. Thus, the shareholder primacy norm has led by extension to the idea
that shareholders should have the power to control the board in order to minimize these agency
costs. This use of the word “agency” has even led some people to refer to the shareholders as
“principals” and boards as “agents” of the shareholders.28 Principals have the right to control
their agents, and agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals, so this misuse of agency law
terminology supports the proposition that shareholders should have more control over boards and
that boards should seek to advance only the interests of the shareholders. However, this
“principal/agent” analysis is simply and unequivocally wrong as a legal matter, and those who
advocate it are distorting the law to serve their political goals.
As is often the case, the two sides of the so-called shareholder/stakeholder debate have
taken their arguments to untenable extremes. No sane business person would suggest that a
board should ignore the interests of the corporation’s employees and customers in order to
enhance shareholder value. The idea is oxymoronic. Similarly, no sane person should expect the
board of a for-profit corporation intentionally to reduce long-term shareholder value in order to
improve the lot of workers or whales. In many instances, a concern for the interests of
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employees, customers, and even the general public will improve the profitability of the business
and therefore enhance shareholder value.29 It is only in rare (but often high-profile) instances,
such as hostile takeovers, that a board’s seeking to protect the long-term interests of the business
might adversely affect the shareholders’ ability to realize value on their investments.30
Defining the interests that the board should consider in carrying out its fiduciary
responsibilities is not the same, however, as defining the beneficiary of that fiduciary duty. A
trustee, for example, is supposed to seek to effectuate the settlor’s intent.31 The settlor is not,
however, the beneficiary of the trust. Similarly, the trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the trust
beneficiaries, but those beneficiaries do not ordinarily have any right to control the acts of the
trustee.32 Thus, the shareholder/stakeholder debate does not necessarily have anything to do with
the board’s fiduciary duties.
The merits of the shareholder/stakeholder debate are not relevant here, however. The
point is to identify the legal relationship between the board and the shareholders without
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allowing the extra-legal rhetoric and economic jargon to mislead us. Is the board the agent of the
shareholders? An agent is a person who has agreed to act on behalf of another person (the
principal) and subject to that person’s control.33 The principal has a complete right of control
over the agent, which serves to offset the fact that the principal is vicariously liable for all the
acts of the agent. The agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal, including the duty to turn
over to the principal all profits or other benefits arising from the relationship. The relationship
between shareholders and directors has none of these features, and it should therefore be
apparent that a board is not an agent of the shareholders.34
Unfortunately, however, the idea that shareholders are the board’s principal has acquired
some authority. A few courts have used the language of principal and agent when discussing the
relationship between the shareholders and the board. The most important of these cases is
Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.,35 in which Chancellor Allen held that a board needed a
compelling justification to interfere with a shareholder vote for directors. In addition to noting
the importance of the shareholder franchise to the “legitimacy of directorial power,”36 the
Chancellor stated that “a decision by the board to act for the primary purpose of preventing the
effectiveness of a shareholder vote inevitably involves the question who, as between the
principal and the agent, has authority with respect to a matter of internal corporate
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governance.”37 Moreover, that “will be true in every instance in which an incumbent board
seeks to thwart a shareholder majority.”38 Judicial review of a board’s interference with a
shareholder vote “involves a determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent
towards his principal. This is not . . . a question that a court may leave to the agent to decide . . .
.”39 Although the Delaware Supreme Court has approved the “basic tenets” of Blasius, it has
generally done so with reference to the legitimating power of the shareholder franchise, not with
reference to the Chancellor’s use of agency law.40 The exception to this appears in MM
Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,41 in which the Supreme Court quoted, without comment, a
long passage from Blasius that includes the language quoted above describing the shareholders
as the board’s principal.42
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If the shareholders are the board’s principal, then the board is obligated to obey the
shareholders’ wishes without considering other interests and without exercising independent
judgment.43 This is a result that many people would prefer, but it is clearly not the law. In
Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp.,44 Chancellor Chandler argued that the contract in question, which
bound the board not to renew a poison pill without shareholder approval, was not void despite
the fact that it sterilized the board’s discretion, a feature that ordinarily invalidates a contract.
The court reasoned, among other things, that the contract essentially permitted the shareholders,
as principals, to make their wishes known to their agents, the board. A month later, in further
proceedings in the same case, the Chancellor described the earlier discussion as an “analogy” to
agency law principles, noting that shareholders “rarely speak with one voice,” and observing that
there may be times when a director’s duty to the corporation requires her to act against the
shareholders’ immediate wishes.45 The board is obligated to exercise its own judgment and
cannot abdicate its responsibilities by tossing decision-making into the shareholders’ collective
lap.46
Legally speaking, the principal of the board, and of anyone else exercising corporate
powers, is the corporation.47 While the idea of the corporation as a separate legal person is now
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often ridiculed as an outmoded over-simplification (at best), it is a handy shorthand term for the
multitudinous interests involved in the profit-making enterprise. Even leaving other
“stakeholders” out of the picture, the shareholders still do not represent the sole corporate
interest. Unless there is only one shareholder, the shareholders do not have a single unitary
interest and cannot be treated as a corporate “principal” with the board as its agent. And even if
the shareholders did have a single interest, any subset of the shareholders (i.e., a majority) would
still be at best an agent of the whole group, and not a principal. Moreover, the board’s authority
extends to the assets legally owned by the corporation, not by the shareholders. The
shareholders have no power over the corporate property and therefore could not delegate that
power to the board or anyone else.48 The shareholders also have no liability for the board’s
negotiating a transaction that will result in the shareholders’ interests in the corporation being
sold or converted, the board is literally acting on behalf of the shareholders, not the corporation,
and is therefore the shareholders’ agent. See In re Cox Comms., Inc., S’holder Litig., 879 A.2d
604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005); ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 108 n.52 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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Compagnie (VOC): The Dutch East India Company, in VOC 1602-2002: 400 YEARS OF
COMPANY LAW 41, 47 (Ella Gepken-Jager et al. eds., 2005). The business was managed by
directors, who were appointed by governors representing the several cities (“chambers”)
included in the combination. See id. at 54-55. The governors were initially appointed by the
States General; thereafter they were supposed to be elected by large shareholders in each
chamber but in practice they simply appointed their own successors. See id. at 55-56. As a
result of complaints from investors, some accountability structures were put in place, but they
protected only the “major shareholders”. See id. at 57. The Danish East India Company,
established in 1616, did away with the chamber system in favor of direct selection of the
governors by the “general meeting” of the shareholders; however, that system quickly changed to
16

actions, unlike a principal. In sum, the relationship between shareholders and the board bears
none of the indicators of a principal/agent relationship.49

The Corporate Contract: Corporate Primacy v. Duties to Shareholders
Although the board and shareholders are not in a principal/agent relationship, they are
clearly in a contractual relationship, a fact which has been recognized at least since Dartmouth
College.50 The certificate of incorporation is a contract that binds the shareholders and the
board, subject to the requirements of the incorporation statute of the state of incorporation.
Identifying the relationship between the board and the shareholders as contractual does not tell us
much, of course; agency is often created by a contractual relationship as well. It is probably
possible to create a corporation that includes an agency relationship between the board and the

one where shareholder control was made more indirect. See Karsten Engsig Sørenson, The
Danish East India Company, in VOC 1602-2002: 400 YEARS OF COMPANY LAW, supra, at 107,
113-118.
49

See Benedict Sheehy, Shareholders, Unicorns and Stilts: An Analysis of Shareholder
Property Rights, 6 J. CORP. L. STUDS. 165, 201 (2006).
50

See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627 (1819).
See also Rogers v. Lafayette Agric. Works, 52 Ind. 296 (1875) (stating that purchase of stock
constitutes a shareholder’s agreement to management by the board of directors). This contract
may be somewhat fictitious in large or established companies, where the contract was entered
into by persons far removed from the current shareholders. Cf. Bebchuk, supra note X, at 862865, 888-890 (describing lack of shareholder power to amend or control amendments to the
charter); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 186-195 (1932) (same). Nevertheless, the shareholders’ participation in every
corporation actually originates with the filing of the (contractual) charter. The corporate contract
is therefore much more real than the social contract purportedly legitimizing government.
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shareholders, but most corporate charters do not create any identifiable relationship between the
parties other than shareholder/director. Pursuant to the corporate contract, the shareholders
commit capital to the operation of a business, and the statute provides that the business will be
managed by a board of directors. They are, as Professor Bainbridge has described it, joined in
the corporate nexus.51 The shareholders have the right by statute to select and remove the board;
this provides at least some protection for their investment. They also have the right to approve
fundamental changes, which are in effect amendments of the basic contract. These are important
rights that courts will protect strenuously.52 However, they are rights created by the statute and
charter and are therefore part of the corporate contract. Unless a contract expressly provides
otherwise, it does not give one party the right to control what the other party does. Contracts
also do not, in themselves, give rise to fiduciary duties.53 Thus, identifying the relationship as a
contractual one tells us nothing about the fiduciary duties of the board or the amount of control
the shareholders have over the board. Only the terms of the contract can tell us that, and most of
the relevant “terms” of the contract among the shareholders, board, and corporation are set by
law.54
The primary legal determinant of the relationship between the shareholders and the board
is embodied in provisions such as Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation law,

51

See BAINBRIDGE, supra note X, at 200.

52

See McIlquham v. Feste, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2004); Rohe
v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 WL 1038190 at *11 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2000) (directors
must be elected regularly and can be removed by the shareholders without limitation).
53

Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 901 A.2d at 114.

54

Whether those terms are mandatory or subject to change by agreement of the parties is
not relevant to this analysis.
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which provides that “the business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors.”55 Because the shareholders are the residual
claimants on the corporate assets they comprise “the corporation” when everyone else is gone.
Because the board’s duties are owed to the “corporation” or the shareholders as a group, the
board should seek to enhance the profitability of the corporation. As discussed above, the
method used to enhance profitability, and the appropriate time horizon, are matters for the
board’s discretion.56 Not only do the shareholders not have the power to interfere in the board’s
management,57 but the shareholders’ power to hold the board to account for its actions is also
limited.58 What should a board do, however, when the interests of the corporation – that is,
profit maximization – conflict with those of a shareholder or group of shareholders? This
situation arises in a number of ways. There are the occasional well-known cases involving
socially responsible shareholders who seek to have the corporation cease some profitable but
socially injurious line of business, in which the courts usually rule that such decisions are within
the purview of the board.59 There are also the takeover cases, which state that a board may take
action against a shareholder who poses a threat to “corporate policy and effectiveness” if the
board’s response is proportionate to the threat and not intended to protect the incumbent
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DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8 § 141(a) (year). See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del.

56

See supra notes X and accompanying text.

57

See Paramount Comms., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994).

58

See BAINBRIDGE, supra note X, at 207.

2000).

59

See, e.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971)
(holding that attempting to force Honeywell to stop manufacturing fragmentation bombs was not
a proper purpose for a shareholder’s books and records request).
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directors’ positions.60 Other cases have stated, at least in dicta, that a board can thwart the will
of a majority of the shareholders, or of a sole majority shareholder, if it has a sufficiently
compelling reason for doing so.61
The rule preferring corporate profitability to the wishes of a subset of shareholders is
consistent with the principle that a contract is invalid if it sterilizes the board’s discretion to act
consistently with its fiduciary duties, unless all the shareholders agree and the corporation’s
creditors are protected.62 To prefer the interests of some shareholders to the interests of the
corporation as a whole (which embodies the common wealth-maximizing interests of all the
shareholders, even if it does not embody the peculiar interests of particular shareholders) would
be to act against the interests of the remaining shareholders. Similarly, the law is clear that a
board must protect the interests of a minority shareholder from injury caused by a majority
shareholder.63 Even a director who was named to the board by a specific shareholder is

60

See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).

61

See Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 299, 304, 306 (Del. Ch. 1994); Blasius Industries
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. 1988) (blocking shareholder vote for directors); Phillips
v. Insituform of North America, Inc., 1987 WL 16285 at *6, *7, *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987)
(diluting majority shareholder’s holdings).
62

See infra note X.

63

See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919-920 (Del. 2000); Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
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obligated to act in the interests of all the shareholders or the corporation as a whole,64 and can,
unless the charter specifies otherwise, be removed for cause by the other shareholders.65
There are, however, a few cases that seem to contradict the corporate-primacy principle.
In VGS, Inc. v. Castiel66 the board of the company (an LLC) consisted of three directors: the
majority shareholder (Castiel), his designee, and the minority shareholder. The minority
shareholder convinced the Castiel designee that Castiel’s control was bad for the company, and
they cooked up a scheme to eliminate his control. “Many LLC employees, and even some of
Castiel’s lieutenants, testified that they believed it to be in the LLC’s best interest to take control
from Castiel.”67 Nevertheless, the court held that the two members of the board had “failed to
discharge their duty of loyalty to [Castiel] in good faith”.68 The relevant fact in VGS, however, is
that the board acted without notice to Castiel, another director, because if it had provided notice
he would have instantly exercised his right to remove his designee from the board and appoint
someone more loyal to him. In doing this, he would have been acting as a shareholder and he

64

See, e.g., McMullin, 765 A.2d at 923; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710
(Del. 1983); Phillips v. Insituform of No. America, Inc., 1987 WL 16285 at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 1987).
65

See Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 WL 1038190, at *12-13 (Del. Ch.
July 21, 2000).
66

2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. 2000).

67

Id. at *2.

68

Id. at *4 (emphasis added). See also Benihana of Tokyo, Inc., v. Benihana, Inc., 891
A.2d 150, 185 n.215 (stating that a director’s seeking to dilute the position of a majority owner
who might pose a threat to the corporation “could constitute an improper purpose” for action).
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would not have been bound by fiduciary duties.69 In other words, the secret board action had the
primary motive of depriving a shareholder of his right to vote for directors, which, under
Blasius70, constitutes a breach of the directors’ duty in the absence of a compelling
justification.71
In other cases where individual shareholders or groups of shareholders had the right, by
contract or pursuant to the certificate of incorporation, to appoint one or more directors, courts
have recognized that those directors are intended to serve a specific function benefiting the
individual shareholder and not necessarily the corporation as a whole.72 Courts have held that
director-designees have the right to share information obtained from their board positions with
the shareholders who appointed them,73 and that it was reasonable for a board to consult a 40%

69

See 2000 WL 1277372 at *4. See also Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Cincinnati v.
Woodlawn Canners, Inc., 1983 WL 18017 at *15-16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 1983) (holding that a
44% shareholder was entitled to vote in its own interest even if doing so caused substantial harm
to the corporation).
70

564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). See supra notes X and accompanying text.

71

Professor Eisenberg convincingly argues that the board in VGS violated its duty of good
faith by manipulating the corporate process in a way that violates corporate norms. See
Eisenberg, supra note X, at 51-57. He does not discuss Blasius.
72

See Moore Business Forms, Inc., v. Cordant Holdings Corp., 1996 WL 307444 at *6
(Del. Ch. June 4, 1996) (noting that purpose of shareholder’s right to designate director was to
protect the shareholder’s interests which were different from, and might conflict with, those of
corporation). See also Benihana of Tokyo, Inc., 891 A.2d at 165 n.76, 166, 187 (discussing
position of director-designees).
73

See Moore Business Forms, Inc., v. Cordant Holdings Corp., 1996 WL 307444 at *4
(Del. Ch. June 4, 1996); Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 121 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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shareholder before acting.74 The courts, at least in Delaware, seem to take a pragmatic approach,
protecting the bargained-for rights of individual shareholders vis-a-vis the corporation, but
protecting the corporation and other shareholders when those individual rights create conflicts
that were not specifically foreseen or foreseeable at the time the special rights were established.75
In sum, the law elevates the interest of the corporation above the interests of any single
shareholder and even above the interests of the shareholders as a group unless the corporate
contract provides otherwise.76

III. The Close Corporation Shareholder Debate, Again
The Enron scandals have cast some interesting light on the debate over shareholder
fiduciary duties. First, the arguments in favor of controlling shareholders owing fiduciary duties
tend to be based on the vulnerable position of minority shareholders, of whom the archetype is
Euphemia Donahue.77 Close corporations are usually defined as those with “a small number of
stockholders, the absence of a market for the corporation’s stock, and substantial shareholder
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See In re Western Nat’l Corp. Shareholders Litig., 2000 WL 10192 at *8 (Del. Ch.
2000). But see McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 924 (Del. 2000) (holding that directors must
use independent judgment in making decision regardless of interests of controlling shareholder).
75

Cf. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 1996 WL 307444 at *6 (noting that conflict of interest
was foreseen); McIlquham v. Feste, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 8, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2002)
(refusing to protect majority shareholder’s right to control board when right had not been
bargained for at the time minority shareholder received right to designate directors).
76

See Strine, supra note X, at ___; Brownstein and Kerman, supra note X, at 42-45;
Brudney, supra note X. The right of shareholders to elect and remove directors is, of course,
part of the corporate contract.
77

See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
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participation in the management of the corporation”.78 In a close corporation, shareholders
“usually expect employment and a meaningful role in management, as well as a return on the
money paid for [their] shares.”79 Because of the majority-rule nature of the corporation, the
majority shareholder, through control of the board of directors, “has the ability to take actions
that are harmful to the minority shareholders’ interests.”80 “Standard [abusive] techniques
include the refusal to declare dividends, the termination of a minority shareholder’s employment,
the removal of a minority shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning off of
corporate earnings through high compensation to the majority shareholder.”81 The minority
shareholder is faced with an “indefinite future with no return on the capital he or she contributed
to the enterprise,”82 and, unlike a shareholder in a public corporation, cannot “simply sell[] its
shares on the market.”83
In contrast, let us consider the situation of those fortunate shareholders in public
corporations, such as the shareholder-employees of Enron or WorldCom. Most of their wealth
was tied up in stock of their employer, and they were dependent for cash flow on employment by
the company because the companies did not pay dividends. They were at the mercy of
management, who were able to extract cash from the company in ways the “minority” were not,
such as through high compensation, other perquisites of office, and self-dealing. When
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Moll, supra note X, at 888.

79

Id. (quoting Thompson, supra note X, at 702).
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Id. at 889.
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Id. at 890.
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Id. at 891 (quoting Thompson, supra note X, at 703).
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management’s wrongdoing was exposed, their employment was terminated, their investments
became worthless, and they had no ready market for their shares. This is exactly the predicament
in which Mrs. Donahue found herself.84
One might argue that the Enron shareholder-employees made their own beds by failing to
diversify their retirement account holdings. By investing solely or primarily in the stock of their
employer, they voluntarily (although perhaps unwisely) sealed their fate. The same is true of
“oppressed” shareholders in close corporations, however, who willingly (although perhaps
unwisely) chose to invest as minority shareholders.85 Furthermore, the fact of shareholder
participation in management, which is generally treated as a feature of closely held
corporations,86 is rapidly increasing as a feature of publicly held corporations as well. This
phenomenon takes two forms, and each form raises a number of issues, as discussed below. It
also serves to demonstrate that the argument in favor of shareholder fiduciary duties based on the
uniqueness of the position of shareholders in close corporations rests on a false premise.87
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Id.
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Actually, Mrs. Donahue was better off than the Enron employees. She continued to
hold shares in a valuable company, although she was unable to liquidate her investment at a price
she liked. If she had retained her stock, she might eventually have earned a substantial return
when the company was sold or liquidated.
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Some minority shareholders wind up in that position because their public company has
been taken over by a controlled corporation, but in that case the law governing takeovers protects
them. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994)
Some people inherit their minority shares, in which case it is difficult to see why they should not
also inherit the unfavorable contractual position assented to by their forebears.
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See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511; Moll, supra note X, at 888.
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I have made this argument previously; the Enron scandals merely illustrate my point.
See Dalley, supra note X, at 193-199.
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IV. Shareholder Activism Part I
The more interesting post-Enron development involves the blossoming of shareholder
activism, a bud that has hung tantalizingly from the vine for many years.88 The term
“shareholder activism” is often used loosely to mean anything done by a shareholder in a public
company other than passively voting with management. However, shareholder activism comes
in two varieties: efforts by institutional investors (usually mutual and pension funds) and
reformers to improve corporate governance, often by removing anti-takeover devices; and efforts
by large individual investors or hedge funds to cause specific changes in the way the company is
being run.89 I discuss each of these in turn.
Lucian Bebchuk’s proposal to give shareholders more power in corporate governance is a
hot controversy on the academic corporate law circuit these days.90 Bebchuk proposes that

88

In 1992, the SEC adopted new rules for disclosure of executive compensation intended
to “improve shareholders’ understanding of all forms of compensation paid to senior executives
and directors, the criteria used by the board of directors in reaching compensation decisions, and
the degree of relationship between compensation and corporate performance. . . .” Executive
Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Rel. No. 31327, Oct. 16, 1992, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1992 Transfer Binder ¶ 85,056 at 83,416. On the same day, the SEC adopted rules to
remove “unnecessary government interference in discussions among shareholders of corporate
performance and other matters of direct interest to all shareholders.” Regulation of
Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Rel. No. 31326, Oct. 16, 1992, FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1992 Transfer Binder ¶85,501 at 83,353. It was widely understood that the latter
set of rules would permit, if not encourage, increased involvement in corporate governance
matters by institutional investors.
89

See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control 15-17 (July 2006), U. of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 0616, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881.
90

See generally Bebchuk, supra note X; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Empowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Strine, supra note X.
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shareholders be given greater power in “rules of the game” matters – changes to the governance
provisions in the certificate of incorporation – which are traditionally within the shareholders’
vetitive jurisdiction (although that jurisdiction is coincident with the board’s).91 He also
proposes that shareholders be given the power to choose, in advance, to make certain business
decisions,92 and to initiate “end of the road” decisions such as sale or dissolution of the
company.93 Leaving aside the merits of these proposals, they raise questions about the fiduciary
duties that would attend the shareholders’ increased powers.94 Shareholder power over rules-ofthe-game decisions seems innocuous enough. Institutional investors have been making
governance proposals for years.95 As Bebchuk notes, those proposals often do not result in
actual change, even when they receive a majority vote of the shareholders.96 This is because
changes to the certificate of incorporation require board, as well as shareholder, approval.97
Bebchuk wants to change this rule.
As noted above, the certificate of incorporation is a contract to which shareholders are
deemed to be parties by virtue of their share ownership.98 Unlike most contracts, this contract
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See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 865.
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See id. at 892.
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See id. at 895-896, 901.
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Vice Chancellor Strine at least implicitly recognizes these problems. See Strine, supra
note X, at ____.
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See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at 15-16.
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See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 852-856.
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See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 242(b)(1).
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See Centaur Partners IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990).
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can be changed without a party’s consent, but it must be done with the approval of both the
board and a majority of the shareholders. The shareholders do not owe any duties when they do
this, but the board does. In fact, the board’s duties when tinkering with governance are
heightened.99 If a majority of the shareholders has the power to change the certificate
unilaterally, the dissenting shareholders will lose the protection provided, at least theoretically,
by the board’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and all the shareholders.100 This
problem may sound more theoretical than actual, but it could cause real harm to dissenting
shareholders.101 In fact, the board’s fiduciary duties are the only protection for minority
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See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del.
1994); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995).
100

See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at 40. The board’s duty to prevent charter
amendments that are not in the best interests of the corporation and all its shareholders is
explored in Brownstein & Kirman, supra note X, at 42-45. Some of the language in Blasius
Industries Inc., 564 A.2d at 660, suggests that a board is always obligated to respect the
expressed wishes of a majority of the shareholders on a corporate governance matter. Because
the Delaware statute gives the power to initiate a charter amendment to the board, however, it
would be odd, at least, to hold that the board did not have discretion in exercising that power.
See also supra Part II.
101

Suppose I am a shareholder in a publicly traded company with a staggered board, and I
like the staggered board because I do not want the company be taken over (perhaps because I
live in the town where it has its headquarters, or because of my tax situation). In fact, I
purchased the shares, and became subject to the terms of the certificate of incorporation,
knowing about the staggered board. Corporate law allows those contract terms to be changed
without my consent if the board and a majority of the shareholders agree. Although the majority
of the shareholders can act selfishly to change the certificate to, for example, cause a short-term
improvement in the price of the stock by increasing the likelihood of a takeover, the board must
consider the interests of the corporation as a whole. It may believe, for example, that the
staggered board, together with a poison pill, gives it power to negotiate with a bidder to protect
shareholder interests, like mine, in a takeover, and therefore refuse to remove the staggered
board provisions. As a “minority” shareholder, I am protected by the board’s veto.
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shareholders in states that (correctly) do not impose duties on controlling shareholders.102 If the
shareholders are to get the power to act unilaterally to legally bind all the other shareholders
through an amendment to the corporate charter, they should also be subject to some
corresponding duty. One option is to apply the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing to
shareholders’ acting to change the certificate of incorporation. This rule would recognize that
the shareholders are exercising a contract right that may affect the other parties’ legitimate
expectations under the existing contract.103 Alternatively, the dissenting shareholders could be
given appraisal rights, which is consistent with the current rule giving shareholders appraisal
rights when they dissent from a merger, which is a change in the fundamental terms of their
investment without their consent.104
Bebchuk’s “let the shareholders make business decisions” proposal is more troubling.
Delaware law provides that shareholders may elect to manage the corporation in statutory close
corporations, but when they do so they are subject to the same duties as directors.105 This rule
should apply to any shareholder or group of shareholders that takes control in lieu of the board,
even in a public company, for the same reason: whoever has power over the corporate property
owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and all its shareholders. Bebchuk’s proposal is
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See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000); Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-43 (Del. 1994).
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See STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH § 2.3.3

(1995).
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Originally, mergers required a unanimous vote of the shareholders. Appraisal rights
compensated the shareholders for the loss of their veto power. See WILLIAM J. CARNEY,
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 19 (2000).
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See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 351 (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 351).
29

somewhat less radical than full shareholder control. He proposes that shareholders be able to
specify in advance that they (and not the board) will have the power to make certain business
decisions, including those involving acquisitions, distributions, and executive compensation.106
In effect, Bebchuk is typing to give the shareholders the power of a principal to control its agent,
the board. As noted above, this is not the existing legal relationship between the shareholders
and the board. That relationship could be changed, of course, and that is the essence of
Bebchuk’s proposal. Under that proposal, however, a group of the shareholders – the majority –
would be given authority to bind, and therefore become the agent of, the whole group or the
corporation. That majority should therefore be subject to an agent’s fiduciary duties when
exercising those discrete powers.107
How might this work in practice? Bebchuk anticipates that the business decisions that
shareholders are most likely to take over are those that are “game-ending” (such as a sale of the
company) and “scaling down” (such as the spin-off of a division or a distribution of cash-onhand),108 because those are decisions in which agency costs between shareholders and
management are particularly high.109 However he acknowledges that under his proposal any
decision is eligible to be taken over by the shareholders.110 So, for example, the shareholders of
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See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 895.
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In the usual case, a majority shareholder does not owe fiduciary duties because it does
not have any legal power over anyone. See Dalley, supra note X, at 207. Under Bebchuk’s
proposal, a majority of the shareholders would have legal power and should therefore be subject
to concomitant duties.
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See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 892.
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See id. at 895.
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See id.
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a corporation might add a provision to the certificate of incorporation requiring that the
corporation distribute as a dividend all cash in excess of some amount. The point of this
provision would be to prevent management from engaging in “empire-building”.111 The board,
however, may believe that technological advances are likely to result in increased competitive
pressures in the intermediate term, and that “hoarding cash” is important to protecting the longterm viability of the business.112 Alternatively, the board may be (quietly) pursuing a business
opportunity that would provide an attractive rate of return on a cash investment. In either case,
the board will be unable to fulfill its fiduciary duty to act in what it believes to be the best
interests of the corporation and all its shareholders, because a majority of the shareholders have
eliminated its discretion with respect to certain aspects of the business. This is a gross violation
of fundamental corporate principles, which invalidate restrictions on the board’s ability to act
consistently with its fiduciary obligations.113 Although such a restriction in the certificate of
incorporation would probably be valid under current law,114 under current law the certificate can
only be amended with the board’s approval115 – approval that is itself subject to fiduciary
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See id. at 902.
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See, e.g., Aaron O. Patrick, James Murdoch Opens the Wallet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
2006, at C1.
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See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934); Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 51. Nor would this provision fall under Galler v. Galler,
203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964), which validated restrictions on the directors that were agreed to by
all the shareholders.
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See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §§ 102(b)(1), 141(a)(1).
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See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 242(b)(1).
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standards. Bebchuk’s proposal would give the power to hamstring the board to a majority of the
shareholders acting unilaterally.116
When a board makes decisions, it has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation and all its shareholders. The decision is protected by the business judgment rule,
however, if it is made by a fully informed and disinterested board acting in good faith. What
about the shareholders? Must their decision be fully informed, disinterested, and in good faith?
It is not clear that the shareholders would be subject to any fiduciary duty in making their
decision, and therefore that they would be under any obligation to become informed117 or to
make the decision in the best interests of the corporation. Traditionally, shareholders have been
permitted to act completely selfishly when voting, even in the presence of conflicts of interest.118
Furthermore, it would be impossible to impose fiduciary duties on the ephemeral majority of
shareholders who made the decision to amend the certificate.119 The fact that the shareholders’
decision to take control of an issue must occur in advance makes it even more difficult to hold
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Not surprisingly, corporate executives have taken a dim view of giving shareholders
control over even rules-of-the-game decisions, arguing that “you run the risk of a . . . board being
unable to make bold decisions that are unpopular with any of these constituencies [e.g., pension
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whether shareholders would become adequately informed. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note X, at
880-882; Bainbridge, supra note X, at 1745. I make a different argument: they should have a
duty to become adequately informed.
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See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at ___.
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Similar considerations have been used to argue against shareholder liability for a
corporation’s torts. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 40-44 (1991).
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them accountable for their decisions, since any adverse effects of their decision will not be felt
until many of the outstanding shares will have changed hands. It also reduces the likelihood that
the shareholders will be making informed decisions appropriate to the circumstances, and it
removes the board’s ability to act quickly with respect to those business matters the shareholders
have chosen to govern. Bebchuk’s proposal is troubling because it would give shareholders
power without subjecting them to a concomitant duty and would thereby create an unaccountable
power-holder, something previously unknown to fiduciary law.120

V. Shareholder Activism Part II
However interesting they may be, Bebchuk’s proposals are merely proposals, and they
are unlikely to become law anytime soon. To the extent institutional shareholders are in fact
seeking to improve corporate governance, they are doing so through existing legal procedures,
and dissenting shareholders are protected by the board’s fiduciary duties. Other shareholders,
primarily hedge funds, are seeking to participate in management by exerting direct moral control
over the board, which raises questions about the fiduciary duties of the board members who may
respond to that control. Examples of this trend appear in the business pages every day, and
include such corporate icons as General Motors, Time Warner, and McDonald’s.121 Because
shareholders do not manage the corporation, these shareholders seek to control the board, using
persuasion, threats, and public exhortation. Often they succeed in placing one or more directors
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on the board. As discussed above, directors owe a duty to exercise independent judgment in the
best interests of the corporation no matter who appointed them.122 When Kerkorian’s handpicked director on the GM board votes the way Kerkorian wants him to vote rather than
exercising his own judgment, has the director violated a duty?123 These shareholders are not
engaging in battles about repealing poison pills or appointing an independent lead director,
matters which at least arguably relate to the balance of power between shareholders and the
board and are therefore legitimate shareholder concerns. These are battles about the way the
company is being run, including how best to realize value for the shareholders and whether to
realize that value in the short term (as some hedge funds and other investors would prefer) or
long term (as management or long-time family owners may prefer).124 In other words, these are
decisions generally covered by the business judgment rule, as long as the board is reasonably
informed and a majority of the board is disinterested, and the activist shareholders involved are
seeking to treat the board as their agents – that is, subject to their control.
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There are a number of questions one might ask about this sort of shareholder activity. Is
it un-American, violating the principles of corporate enterprise that helped make this nation
great?125 Is it a welcome check on the increasingly unresponsive management of public
companies?126 Is it a pointless waste of management time and attention because shareholders
cannot possibly have the information, incentives, and expertise necessary to make better
decisions than current management?127 Does it contribute to the rise of the “shareholder primacy
norm” and therefore to the kind of behavior that led to the millennial financial scandals?128
These are all interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this Article. My focus here is
two related issues: What duties are owed by the representative of that shareholder on the board?
And does the activist investor risk liability when, as a shareholder, it interferes in management
decisions?
As noted above, fiduciary duties arise from a person’s exercise of legal power over
another’s person or property, but do not arise from moral control. The fiduciary with legal
power over the corporation is the board; a shareholder does not have legal power over the
corporate property, although it may have moral control over members of the board.
Shareholders, whether controlling or not, are not “principals” of the board and therefore have no
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legal control over the board. Therefore, they must act by influencing the board.129 The first
issue is therefore what duties are owed by a shareholder’s designee on the board.
As discussed in Part II, above, the board owes its duties to the corporation and all its
shareholders. This is true not only for the board as a whole, but also for any single board
member, including those designated by minority shareholders. One might argue that it is
acceptable for such designees to represent their shareholders’ interests because, as minority
board members, they cannot do any harm and because they may do some good by presenting a
different perspective that is less deferential to management. The latter argument has some merit,
but it begs the question. The alternative perspective that the designee presents must be a
perspective on what is best for the corporation or it will not add value to board decision-making.
The former argument, that designees can be allowed to act as their shareholders direct because
they pose no threat to the corporation, fails to recognize the process by which boards operate.
Board members can act only as a group; a single board member has no authority to act for the
corporation. Although most boards act by majority rule,130 in practice boards generally operate
by consensus.131 Thus, a single director on a board of more than two will be unable, legally, to
cause the corporation to do anything. This merely restates the proposition that, as a legal matter,
no director or group of directors can cause the corporation to do anything; only the full board can
do that.
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As a practical matter, however, some directors may exercise more moral control than
others where, for example, the director is sufficiently persuasive and strong-willed and the rest of
the board is malleable or deferential.132 In that case, the resulting board action will appear to
have been – legally must have been – taken by the board as a whole, and it will be difficult to
prove that a single director was the instigator of the decision.133 Lone directors occasionally
make their individual views known, but only when they are dissenting from actions taken by the
board.134 In other words, we will rarely know whether a designated director has exercised any
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real control in any given decision, and in most cases it will be the board as a whole that will be
judged.135 There are cases, however, where the influence of a single director or small group of
directors not only causes change, but is known publicly to have done so.136 This is especially
likely to occur when a director has a separate agenda.137
If shareholder’s designees owe duties to the corporation and the shareholders as a
whole,138 what do those duties entail? The usual standard of care is generally stated to be that of
the ordinary prudent person in the same or similar circumstances.139 The operation of the
business judgment rule protects a decision if it is made by an independent, informed board acting
in what it believes in good faith to be the best interests of the corporation.140 A director who
merely rubber-stamps the decision of management has failed in her duty of care because she has
not exercised her own independent, informed judgment.141 A director that serves only as a
shareholder’s mouthpiece has similarly failed to exercise her own independent, informed
judgment and therefore has breached her fiduciary duty.
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The next question is, which fiduciary duty is implicated when a director-designee does
the shareholder’s bidding without exercising independent judgment?142 In Delaware, a breach of
the duty of care generally involves a failure to become reasonably informed143 or gross
negligence generally.144 A director who does her shareholder’s bidding without becoming fully
informed probably violates that duty.145 If she becomes fully informed, perhaps out of curiosity,
but fails to exercise her independent judgment in the best interests of the corporation, she will
not have breached her duty of care but may have breached either her duty of loyalty or her duty
of good faith, or perhaps both. The Delaware Supreme Court has recently stated that “intentional
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” constitutes a breach of the
duty of good faith.146 “A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
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corporation . . . .”147 A director’s following the instructions of a shareholder, rather than
exercising her own judgment about what is in the best interests of the corporation and all its
shareholders, would appear to fall squarely within this definition of bad faith.148 Incumbent
directors have in fact used the prospect of such misplaced loyalty to fight shareholder nominees,
arguing that they will not “think independently and vote their own conscience” or act as
“independent voices accountable to all shareholders.”149
The question whether such a director also violates her duty of loyalty is more difficult.
Loyalty entails two concepts that are essentially reverse images of each other: interest and
independence. An interested director is not independent; neither is a director who is “dominated
and controlled” by an interested person.150 A director is dominated and controlled when she is
“beholden” to an interested person and “so under [that person’s] influence that [her] discretion
would be sterilized.”151 Merely owing one’s position as a director to another does not make one
beholden to that person,152 but more substantial financial ties, such as a situation in which the
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director’s full-time employment was within another’s control, might.153 However, the fact that a
director is dominated and controlled by another is only relevant if the other person is herself
“interested”.
“Interest” is usually defined as a financial interest not shared by other shareholders.154
Broadly speaking, however, a conflict of interest can arise from any circumstance that impairs
the director’s ability to make a decision “based on the corporate merits of the subject before the
board rather than extraneous considerations or influences.”155 Thus, while a director-designee
may not meet the usual definition of interest in a transaction not directly involving the
designating shareholder, she probably is not independent either.156 Moreover, in many cases the
interests of the activist shareholder and those of all the shareholders as a group may diverge.157
Whether the shareholder’s divergent interest is sufficient to taint her designee on the board will
depend on the seriousness of the conflict. In many cases, the activist’s interest will be different
from but not directly conflicting with the interests of the rest of the shareholders. In that case,
the director will not be interested even if she is dominated and controlled by the shareholder.
She will not be independent, but mere lack of independence probably does not constitute a
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breach of the duty of loyalty where a director is not interested.158 In sum, the director-designee,
if acting as a mouthpiece for her shareholder, probably violates her duties of care159 and good
faith.160 A similar analysis would apply where any director is seeking to protect any interest
other than that of the corporation writ large.161
This analysis suggests that there are a lot of breaches of the fiduciary duty of good faith
occurring across corporate America. Every time a director does what someone else suggests
without exercising independent judgment she breaches her duty. When directors act without
independent judgment out of laziness, spinelessness, or psychological or structural “bias”162, they
may breach their duties of care if they are grossly negligent. However, they are usually not
liable for that breach because of the business judgment rule. But when they act without
independent thought out of loyalty to another, they violate the duty of good faith and they are not
protected by the business judgment rule. Of course, they will not actually be liable for anything
unless something bad can be shown to have occurred as a result of their breach. Activist
investors have been successful in causing changes at a number of companies in the past few
years.163 If the board, including designated directors, acted out of loyalty to or fear of an activist
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shareholder, or even simply because it was tired of listening to the whining of an activist
investor, it has breached its duties and may, in an extreme case, face liability.164
So how does this relate to the duty of shareholders? If a director violates a fiduciary duty
because she acts out of loyalty to an individual shareholder and not to the company, the
shareholder should be equally liable for complicity in the breach. This can be vicarious liability
under agency principles or aiding and abetting liability. The latter treatment merely implicates
the general principle that one who aids or instigates a breach of duty is also liable for the
breach.165 The former treatment, however, raises another interesting problem in corporate law.
Case law states expressly that directors are not agents of the shareholders who elect them.166
This rule would be better phrased as, “Directors had better not be agents of the shareholders who
elect them, or they are in deep trouble.”167 Agency requires that the agent be under the control of
the principal. A director who is doing her job is not under the control of anyone – that is the
essence of independent judgment. So, when a director acts out of loyalty to another, not only has
she violated her fiduciary duty, she may have acted as an agent of the other person.168 There is
no reason to deny automatically the existence of an agency relationship, and therefore of
vicarious liability, in that situation.
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VI. Conclusion
In sum, a corporate act undertaken on behalf of a specific shareholder (any shareholder)
that injures the other shareholders or the corporation itself entails a breach of fiduciary duty by
the directors who so acted, and the instigating shareholder is also liable for that breach under
basic agency principles. No “shareholder fiduciary duty” is implicated. Existing law, properly
applied, not only addresses the problem of harmful corporate169 acts, it also does so without
doing violence to the principle that shareholders do not manage (and therefore do not owe duties
to) the corporation. Suppose instead that we adopt the view that shareholders owe duties to the
corporation and other shareholders. When is this duty implicated? When the noisy investor
begins pressuring the board? When the investor votes? That is clearly within her rights as a
shareholder. The only way an investor can cause harm is by controlling the board. So the law
finds and punishes the breach when and where it happens – when the board members act
disloyally.
This analysis is not new. What is new is the number of instances of directors of publicly
traded corporations, hitherto not the subject of shareholder fiduciary duty analysis, making
business decisions directed by individual shareholders. The duties of those directors, and the
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potential responsibility of the shareholders who appoint them, are therefore of heightened
importance.
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